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FOREWARD
Perspectives on Corporate Mergers and the
Antitrust Laws
C. Paul Rogers*
I.
Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits corporate acquisitions
which "may . ..substantially lessen competition .. .or tend to
create a monopoly."' This indefinite language was intended by
Congress to enable courts to address incipient trends toward con-
centration resulting from acquisition or merger." The statute deals
in probabilities, not certainties. Although providing a malleable
standard that can be used to curtail corporate expansion with an-
ticompetitive overtones, the statute is inapplicable to increased
concentration by means other than acquisition.
Thus, it is at once necessary to recognize both the flexibility and
limits of the statute. Recognizing the limitations of section 7 does
not, however, reduce its importance in addressing collections of
corporate power. Without question, corporate mergers, acquisi-
tions, and take-overs are responsible, in large measure, for the con-
tinuing concentration of American free enterprise." The desirabil-
ity of this trend is the subject of much debate.' By necessity, the
normative question concerning the role of section 7 in abating the
trend is at the center of the debate.
* Associate Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976).
2. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586, 589-91 (1957),
citing S. REP. No. 698, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1914). See also Brown Shoe v. United States,
370 U.S. 294, 316 n. 29 (1962).
3. Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § (1976), guards against corporate expansion
by any means which rises to monopoly dimension.
4. See, e.g., Mueller, Mergers Among Large Firms in Hearings on Economic Concentra-
tion Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary, Part 2, Mergers and Other Factors Affecting Industry Concentration, Pursuant
to S. Res. 40, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 515-20 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Mueller].
5. See text accompanying notes 66-87 infra.
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It is interesting to speculate that the adaptability and pliancy of
section 7 may indeed be a substantial weakness in its enforcement.
The language of section 7 abdicates, to a significant extent, the leg-
islative function to the judiciary.6 The courts are given great lati-
tude in interpreting and applying the statute to myriad situations
involving acquisitions of corporate wealth. The same point can be
made about sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act and section 5 of
the Federal Trade Commission Act. This may underscore the ne-
cessity for the transfer of the legislative function to the courts to
enable them to deal effectively with the peculiarities of restraints
of trade and monopolies. Given the state of academic understand-
ing of these subjects at the time of the passage of the antitrust
acts, Congress perceived, no doubt properly, that only a penumbra
was needed.7 The courts seemed to be the appropriate forum to
work out the details on a case by case basis. In this context, how-
ever, judicial attitudes toward big business and economic concen-
tration necessarily shape the development of the law.
The resulting difficulty is that sixty-five years after passage of
the Clayton Act and thirty years after its last amendment, it is still
uncertain when the Act should apply. For example, the coming of
the conglomerate merger has wreaked its own havoc. When the
original version of section 7 was enacted in 1914, Congress was pri-
marily concerned with the elimination of direct competition be-
tween competitors rather than with the uncertain competitive ef-
fects of geographic or product-extension acquisitions which were
rare at that time.8 In fact, not until 1957 did it become firmly es-
6. The operative language of the statute concerns the substantial lessening of competi-
tion or tendency to create a monopoly. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1976). Neither term is defined in
the Act.
7. But see Letwin, Congress and the Sherman Antitrust Law: 1887-1890, 23 U. CHI. L.
Rav. 221 (1956). It is certain that § 7 of the Clayton Act, particularly the 1950 Cellar-
Kefauver Amendment which extended coverage to include asset acquisitions, 64 Stat. 1125
(1950), was viewed by Congress as imposing a stricter standard of illegality than the Sher-
man Act. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 318 n.33 (1962). See also G.
HENDERSON, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION: A STUDY IN ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PROCE-
DURE 16-36 (1924); D. MARTIN, MERGERs AND THE CLAYTON ACT 20-56 (1959).
8. Section 7 originally made stock acquisitions illegal "where . .. the effect of such ac-
quisition may be to substantially lessen competition between the corporation whose stock is
so acquired and the corporation making the acquisition." (emphasis added). Clayton Act,
ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 731-32 (1914). The 1950 amendment deleted the underlined language
and eliminated any concern that § 7 might apply only to mergerrs involving directly com-
peting firms. Celler - Kefauver Act of December 29, 1950, ch. 184, 64 Stat. 1125 (1950). See
also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317 & n.30 (1962).
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tablished that section 7 applied even to vertical mergers.9 The 1950
Cellar-Kefauver Amendment was directed to closing a large loop-
hole in the law in that section 7 previously had applied only to
stock acquisitions. When Congress amended the Act to include as-
set acquisitions, 10 however, it is unclear whether or not the con-
glomerate merger was of principal legislative focus. Conglomerate
mergers simply did not predominate in 1950.11 The diversification
of American corporations in the last twenty years has changed
that. According to one estimate, conglomerate mergers now ac-
count for eighty to ninety percent of all corporate acquisitions.1'
II.
The uncertainty surrounding and trust merger law can be traced
to more than a change in the nature of corporate expansion. The
personnel change in the United States Supreme Court in the early
1970's coupled with the "new learning" about the pros and cons of
industrial concentration also has contributed to the current quan-
dary."3 For example, the Warren Court, in deciding a wave of
merger cases during the 1960's, interpreted the latitude given to
the courts by section 7 as a mandate to eliminate any increase in
market concentration if fomented by corporate acquisitions. 14 In
reviewing horizontal mergers, the Court focused on the elimination
of actual competition between competitors if the market was con-
centrated or if a perceptible trend towards concentration existed."'
When faced with a vertical or conglomerate merger, the Court rec-
9. See United States v. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
10. The government's failure to successfully challenge an asset merger with horizontal
and vertical aspects under the Sherman Act in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334
U.S. 495 (1948) prompted Congress to action. See L. SULLIVAN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF
ANTITRUST § 198 (1977); Zlinkoff & Barnard, Mergers and the Antitrust Laws: The Colum-
bia Steel Case, The Supreme Court and a Competitive Economy, the 1947 Term, 97 U.P.A.
L. REV. 151 (1948).
11. Approximately 38 percent of mergers were conglomerate in nature in 1950. 125
CONG. REC. S.2418 (daily ed. March 8, 1979)(statement of Sen. Kennedy).
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., INDUSTmAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEW LEARNING (H. Goldschmid, H. Mann,
J. Weston, eds. 1974); U.S. DEP'T oF COMMERCE, MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY (1980)
[hereinafter MERGERS AND ECONOMC EFFICIENCY]; P. STEINER, MERGERS: MOTIVES, EFFECTS,
POLICIES (1975).
14. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 317-18 (1962).
15. See United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546 (1966); United States v. Von's
Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966); United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 377 U.S. 271
(1964); United States v. Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441 (1964); United States v. Phila-
delphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963); Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294
(1962).
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ognized the importance of potential competition for the support of
its anticoncentration policy.16 The Court saw that, although a
merger might not eliminate direct or actual competition, potential
entrants into an oligopolistic market could exert significant com-
petitive influence over the behavior of existing firms.17 Thus, if a
merger eliminated potential competition, it was understood that
the competitive equilibrium of the marketplace could be disturbed
with a resulting likelihood of more oligopolistic behavior by ex-
isting competitors. The potential for deconcentration because of
the merger's elimination of viable, new independent entrants also
was regarded as significant. 18
The Warren Court's approach was to create predictability in
merger law by simplifying the legal analysis when possible.' 9 The
Court was heavily influenced by statistical evidence of market con-
centration and foreclosure. The Burger Court, in contrast, has con-
sistently looked to other market factors when reviewing mergers.
In doing so, the Burger Court has found only one violation of sec-
tion 7.'0 This change of merger philosophy by the Court signifies
one of two things. It may mean that section 7 has lost much of its
ability to deal with the anticompetitive effects of corporate expan-
sion by acquisition; or it may simply indicate that mergers do not
generally create, upon close inspection, substantial competitive dis-
incentives. If that is true, then section 7 was both misapplied and
overapplied by the Warren Court.
A brief comparison of two decisions is illustrative of this shift in
approach. In 1966, the Warren Court decided United States v.
Von's Grocery Co.,"1 a case involving the purchase of Shopping
Bag Food Stores, the sixth largest grocery store chain in the Los
Angeles area, by Von's, the third largest chain in the area. Al-
though the two firms together accounted for only seven and one
half percent of the retail groceries sold in the Los Angeles market,
the Supreme Court struck down the merger. Justice Black, writing
for the majority, was concerned that the combination of two suc-
cessful, aggressive competitors, resulting in the second largest
16. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); FTC v. Consolidated Foods
Corp., 380 U.S. 592 (1965); United States v. Penn-Olin Chemical Co., 378 U.S. 158 (1964).
17. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 578 (1967).
18. Id. at 579.
19. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 589-90 (1967)(Harlan, J., concur-
ring); United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
20. Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972).
21. 384 U.S. 270 (1966).
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chain in the area, would exacerbate the trend of absorption of
small grocery companies by larger ones.22 He was particularly con-
cerned with the decline in the number of single store operations.'
Section 7 was unabashedly read as aimed at keeping a large num-
ber of small firms in business in order to prevent economic
concentration. 4
Justice Stewart wrote a blistering dissent.'5 Stewart viewed the
majority's concern about the declining number of single store oper-
ations as overly simplistic and reactionary. 26 He found no causal
relationship between the decrease of single store groceries and ac-
quisitions by chains because chains were not purchasing single out-
lets. According to Justice Stewart, changes in society since World
War II had effected the demise of the neighborhood specialty
store."8 He did not view section 7 as a cure for technological and
economic changes of this sort, particularly given the lack of merger
activity involving small or single store outlets.
Justice Stewart also took exception to the majority's finding of a
trend towards concentration in the retail grocery market, particu-
larly as affected by the acquisition in question. Only by guaging
the level of concentration by the decrease in the total number of
competitors could such a trend be discerned, Stewart argued, be-
cause the market shares of the two leading firms had declined in
the decade before the merger.2' Even though the market share of
the top twenty firms had increased, a substantial turnover in the
membership of the top twenty had occurred. 0 These factors, cou-
pled with the "turbulent history of entry and exit of competing
small chains," indicated to Justice Stewart an "obvious procreative
vigor of competition in the market.""1
22. Id. at 278.
23. The number of single store owners in the Los Angeles market had declined from
5,365 in 1950 to 3,590 by 1963. Id. at 273.
24. Id. at 275. See also Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315, 344 (1962).
25. Justice White concurred in the majority opinion. 384 U.S. at 280. Justice Harlan
joined in Justice Stewart's dissenting opinion. Id. at 281.
26. Id. at 289.
27. Id. at 293. Justice Stewart further pointed out that the number of competing chains
had increased even though some chains had been acquired by larger chains. Id.
28. Id. at 288-89.
29. Between 1948 and 1958 the market share of the leading entrant, Safeway, had de-
clined from 14 percent to 8 percent. The combined shares of the top two chains had de-
clined from 21 percent to 14 percent. Id. at 290.
30. The market share of the top 20 firms had increased from 44 percent to 57 percent
between 1948 and 1958, but seven of the 1958 top twenty did not exist ten years before. Id.
31. Id. at 292.
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Justice Stewart was also at odds with the majority's characteri-
zation of the effect of the acquisition by Von's Grocery on the mar-
ket structure. He viewed the merger as primarily a market exten-
sion rather than a horizontal acquisition because more than one-
half of the stores of the acquiring and acquired firms did not com-
pete with each other for customers.82 The total market share fore-
closed was, then, less than one percent of the total grocery sales in
the Los Angeles area.83
Finally, Justice Stewart looked beyond statistics to determine
the impact of the merger. He asserted that Shopping Bag, the ac-
quired firm, was on the decline and was something less than a pow-
erful force in the market place." Further, the advent of coopera-
tive buying organizations formed by small chains enabled even
single store operators to purchase goods at prices competitive with
those paid by the large chains." Moreover, no substantial barriers
to entry existed." Thus, by focusing both on the health of the ac-
quired company and the economic realities of small competitors in
the market, Justice Stewart concluded that the increase in the
market share of the merged firm was not concomitant with any
increase in its market power.87
Eight years after Von's Grocery, the Supreme Court decided an-
other horizontal merger case, United States v. General Dynamics
Corp.'s The make-up of the Court had changed dramatically in the
interval, resulting in a pronounced effect on section 7 enforce-
ment.89 Justice Stewart wrote for the majority in a five to four de-
cision which upheld the merger of two coal producers competing in
32. Further, the actual overlap in sales between the two firms represented only about 25
percent of their combined Los Angeles sales. Id. at 296.
33. Id. Interestingly, neither the majority nor the dissent considered the potential com-
petition aspects of the merger. If the merger was in fact a market extension type, the influ-
ence that Von's, the acquiring firm, exerted over the acquired firm's market as an actual or
perceived potential independent entrant would be relevant in determining the likely an-
ticompetitive effects of the acquisition.
34. The district court found that Shopping Bag had suffered from a lack of qualified
management and, although sales were increasing, declining earnings and profits. 348 U.S. at
298.
35. Id. at 298-99. See also United States v. Topco Assoc., Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
36. 384 U.S. at 300.
37. Id. at 297.
38. 415 U.S. 486 (1974).
39. Warren Burger had replaced Earl Warren as Chief Justice. Justices Blackmun, Pow-
ell, and Rehnquist had been appointed by President Nixon to replace Justices Fortas, Black,
and Harlan, respectively. Justice Marshall was a Johnson appointment subsequent to Von's
Grocery, succeeding Justice Clark.
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one of the four major coal distribution areas. All of the new ap-
pointees to the Court joined with the majority.40 Justice Douglas
wrote a dissent and was joined by Justices Brennan, White, and
Marshall, all Warren Court holdovers. 4'1 Thus, the four Burger
Court appointees voted to allow the merger in General Dynamics,
replacing three Warren Court votes to enjoin the acquisition in
Von's Grocery.2
Through a series of stock transactions, General Dynamics had
become the country's fifth largest commercial coal producer. The
government's case rested upon the proposition that a 1959 acquisi-
tion of United Electric Coal Companies' stock by Material Service
Corporation, which was later acquired by General Dynamics, sub-
stantially lessened competition in the sale and production of coal
in two geographic areas.' 8 The government's approach was to show
that a trend towards further concentration in an already concen-
trated coal market would be significantly advanced by the merger
because the merger would materially enlarge the market share of
the acquiring company." The number of coal producing companies
in Illinois had decreased from 144 to 39 between 1957 and 1967."5
The acquisition had, using 1957 figures, increased the market share
of the top two producers either by fourteen and one half percent or
twenty two and four tenths percent, depending on the relevant ge-
ographic market."
The Court, in allowing the purchase, recognized that previous
horizontal merger decisions had found "prima facie" violations of
section 7 from statistical evidence such as that presented by the
government.'7 The Court further stated that "in the absence of
40. Excluding Justice Marshall, who joined the dissent.
41. 415 U.S. 486, 511 (1974)(Douglas, J., dissenting). Justices Douglas and Brennan had
been with the majority in Von's Grocery, and Justice White had concurred with the major-
ity. Of course, Justice Stewart was a Warren Court holdover but he had dissented in Von's
Grocery, 384 U.S. 270, 281 (1966)(Stewart, J., dissenting).
42. Justice Harlan, whose seat had been taken by Justice Rehnquist, had joined in Jus-
tice Stewart's Von's Grocery dissent.
43. 415 U.S. at 490.
44. Id. at 494.
45. Id. at 495.
46. Id. According to the government, the relevant geographic market was either Illinois
or the Eastern Interior Coal Province which was one of four major coal producing areas in
the country and was comprised of Illinois, Indiana, and parts of Kentucky, Tennessee, Iowa,
Minnesota, Virginia, and Missouri. Id. at 490.
47. Id. at 496-97, citing Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315 (1962);
United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963); United States v.
Continental Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 458 (1964); United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S.
19811
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other considerations," the government's statistical offerings would
support a finding of "undue concentration."' 8 Evidence of the coal
industry's "structure, history and probable future," however, was
thought necessary to judge accurately the competitive effect of the
merger. 9
In looking beyond percentage market foreclosure evidence, the
Court went further than the analysis of Justice Black in Von's
Grocery and closely mirrored the analytical approach of Justice
Stewart's dissent in that case. For example, the Court regarded as
significant the district court's finding that the percentage share of
coal in relation to all energy consumed had fallen from seventy
eight and four tenths percent in 1920 to twenty one and four
tenths percent in 1968. The decline was attributed to changes in
distribution and demand, as well as to the increased attractiveness
of alternative fuels brought about by technological advances and
increased environmental regulation of coal extraction. 50 The elec-
tric utility industry had become the primary consumer of coal
within the preceding twenty years. Almost all coal sold to utilities
was by long-term requirements contracts. As a result, limited
amounts of coal were available on the open market for "spot"
purchases."'
The Court held that the basic changes in the demand for and
sales method of coal justified the district court's conclusion that
the government's statistical evidence was not, when viewed in con-
text, sufficient to prove an anticompetitive effect. 2 Proof of past
and present market shares was misleading, according to the Court,
because it did not reflect current competition for the procurement
of new long-term supply contracts.5" Past and present coal pro-
duction was typically already committed under previously negoti-
ated supply agreements." The most significant factor in determin-
ing the competitive impact of a merger of coal producers was
thought to be the acquired company's uncommitted coal reserves.68
270, 277 (1966); United States v. Pabst Brewing Co., 384 U.S. 546, 550-52 (1966).
48. 415 U.S. at 497-98.
49. Id. at 498.
50. Id. at 499.
51. Id. at 499-500.
52. Id. at 501.
53. Id. at 501-02.
54. Thus, statistical evidence of coal production was not of great significance in measur-
ing the current competitive power of a firm. Id. at 501.
55. Id. at 502.
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United, the acquired company, had very limited uncommitted
reserves and was not in a position to acquire additional reserves."
United was thus unable to compete vigorously for new supply con-
tracts and was, the Court concluded, a far less significant factor in
the coal market than the government's statistics suggested.6 7
General Dynamics demonstrates that Justice Stewart gained
several adherents to his merger philosophy in the Warren Court-
Burger Court transition. By looking beyond statistical evidence to
market structure and demand behavior, merger analysis became at
once more complicated and, hopefully, more reflective of the true
competitive impact of acquisitions. 8 Cynics could argue, however,
that the Burger Court is using this increased sophistication to de-
feat the intent of Congress to prohibit mergers which have an in-
cipient anticompetitive effect. Indeed, the dissent in General Dy-
namics took grave exception to the majority's structural analysis,
stating that the analysis fell far short of considering all relevant
market factors and reflected "a deep-seated judicial bias against
section 7 of the Clayton Act."' It is troublesome that the Supreme
Court spectrum has swung so dramatically; the government cannot
win in an area where fifteen years previously it could not lose.
Part of the difficulty with the Burger Court approach to section
7 does lie in the complexity of the analysis and the uncertainty
that results. In contrast, the Warren Court's penchant for statistics
and trends produced a more bright-line standard and thus pro-
vided a substantial degree of predictability for business." Of
56. United, the acquired company, ranked fifth among Illinois coal producers in annual
production but tenth in reserve holdings, controlling less than one percent of reserve hold-
ings held by coal producers in Illinois, Indiana, and Western Kentucky. United's reserves
were so depleted that it had already closed several mines. Id.
57. Id. at 503.
58. Although General Dynamics produced substantial ammunition for defendants in
horizontal merger cases, the decision also led to uncertainty and inconsistency in the lower
courts. See generally Note, Horizontal Mergers After United States v. General Dynamics
Corp., 92 H~Av. L. Rsv. 491 (1978).
59. 415 U.S. at 527. See also Kirkpatrick & Mahinka, The Supreme Court and the "New
Economic Realism" of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 30 Sw. L.J. 821 (1976); Lurie, Mergers
Under the Burger Court: An Anti-Antitrust Bias and Its Implications, 23 VL. L. REv. 213
(1978).
60. Arguably the Warren Court came close to adopting a per se rule for mergers result-
ing in a large market share foreclosure. In United States v. Philadelphia National Bank, the
Court stated:
intense congressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants dis-
pensing, in certain cases, with elaborate proof of market structure, market behav-
ior, or probable anti-competitive effects. Specifically, we think that a merger
which produces a firm controlling an undue percentage share of the relevant mar-
.1981]
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course, predictability in the law is a valued commodity. It en-
hances informed business planning and deters obvious anticompe-
titive conduct.' However, Von's Grocery suggests the possibility
that a simplified analysis may result in a finding of illegality in a
"trend" market when the increased concentration may not be at-
tributable to merger activity and the merger in question may have
little anticompetitive effect. In other words, statistical appearances
may be deceiving.
The Burger Court's emphasis on the operation of the market in
question may, however, have the overall effect of lessening the
reach of section 7, even with regard to mergers in which the appar-
ent market foreclosure is substantial. For example, the General
Dynamics case creates the opportunity for a broad number of de-
fenses relating to the business and economic realities of the mar-
ket.6 2 A strong statistical case, is considered only prima facie evi-
dence of an anticompetitive effect.6 Evidence to rebut the
presumption is ultimately within the province of the trier of fact.
A reviewing court can reverse only for errors of law, which of
course leaves considerable discretion to the trier of fact when eval-
uating defendant's evidence of market structure and behavior. The
defendant, in effect, has nothing to lose by profferring rebuttal evi-
dence. If the trier of fact is convinced by the defendant's proof, the
effect is to limit section 7, at least as that section was interpreted
by the Warren Court.
This limitation possibility is amplified by the Burger Court's re-
luctance to set forth broad guidelines for merger decision-making.
Again, using General Dynamics for illustration, that decision gives
little guidance except to mandate more flexibility in considering
ket, and results in a significant increase in the concentration of firms in that mar-
ket, is so inherently likely to lessen competition substantially that it must be en-
joined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effects.
374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963). If Philadelphia National Bank buried the need for a broad factual
inquiry in horizontal merger cases, General Dynamics probably resurrected it.
61. In another context, the Court has noted the risk of "overdeterrence" and over-regu-
lation of free enterprise with regard to business behavior proscribed by the antitrust laws
which is "difficult to distinguish from the gray zone of socially acceptable and economically
justifiable business conduct." United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 441
(1978). Thus, where the legal standards are uncertain, obvious anticompetitive conduct may
not be so obvious and procompetitive conduct may be unwittingly deterred.
62. See Ponsoldt, The Expansion of Horizontal Merger Defenses After General Dynam-
ics: A Suggested Reconsideration of Sherman Act Principles, 12 Loy. CHI. L.J. 361 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Ponsoldt].
63. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 415 U.S. 486, 496 (1974).
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mergers. The decision is unclear about the weight to be accorded
justification evidence or the limitations, if any, upon such proof."
Other Burger Court decisions can arguably be confined to their
"unique" facts as well." Thus, the Burger Court approach can be
viewed as at once sophisticated and openended. In evaluating this
approach, the benefit of increased sophistication in pinpointing
only acquisitions with real anticompetive consequences must be
balanced against the possible contraction of the application of sec-
tion 7 to questionable mergers because of the expanded flexibility
and latitude given to the trier of fact.
III.
Accentuating the judicial uncertainty surrounding antitrust
merger law is the academic and legislative debate and doubt about
the actual competitive effect of economic growth by acquisition.
The contention centers around two broad, overlapping issues. The
first concerns the role of economic efficiency in merger adjudica-
tion. The second focuses upon the economic consequences of con-
glomerate acquisitions.
The efficiency question has arisen primarily in the vertical and
conglomerate context and has been a source of controversy since
the 1962 Supreme Court decision in Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States." In Brown Shoe, the government argued that the purchase
of a large independent retail chain of shoe stores by a large shoe
manufacturer would be anticompetitive because the resulting inte-
grated company would, through increased efficiencies, be able to
undercut local, unintegrated competitors. Counsel for the defen-
dant apparently had felt forced to argue that the merger produced
no consumer benefits or economic advantages.67 The Supreme
Court agreed with the government and held that the increased effi-
ciencies supported the conclusion that the merger was unlawful,
irrespective of consumer benefit.68 The decision quickly produced
64. See Ponsoldt, supra note 62, at 375-76.
65. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975);
United States v. Marine Bancorporation, Inc., 418 U.S. 602 (1974); United States v. The
Connecticut National Bank, 418 U.S. 656 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp.,
410 U.S. 526 (1973).
66. 370 U.S. 294 (1962). See Williamson, Economics as an Antitrust Defense Revisited,
125 U. PA. L. REv. 699 (1977).
67. See Blake & Jones, Toward a Three-Dimensional Antitrust Policy, 65 COLuM. L.
REv. 422, 456-57 (1965) [hereinafter cited as Blake and Jones].
68. 370 U.S. at 344.
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a plethora of criticism." Subsequently, the 1968 Department of
Justice Merger Guidelines stated an enforcement policy of not ac-
cepting, absent exceptional circumstances, increased economic effi-
ciency as a justification for a merger.7 0 The position of the Depart-
ment of Justice was arguably a retreat from the Brown Shoe
position that improved efficiency was a factor supporting illegality.
Questions concerning economic efficiency are also pivotal to the
debate over conglomerate mergers. Efficiencies resulting from a
product or geographic extension acquisition may have additional
appeal as a justification for the merger, at least superficially, be-
cause the anticompetitive effects of such a merger appear more
problematic. In fact, two focal points can be discerned in the con-
glomerate merger debate. In addition to the efficiency dialogue, the
validity of the potential competition theories is being extensively
questioned.71
The efficiency enigma is itself severable. One question involves
the legal standards to be accorded demonstrable gains in efficiency.
The courts thus far have had little to say about efficiency consider-
ations in conglomerate cases. Justice Harlan, concurring in FTC v.
Proctor & Gamble Co., 73 argued that economic efficencies are
procompetitive because competitive benefits gained thereby "may
stimulate matching innovation by others, the very essence of com-
69. See, e.g., Kauper, The "Warren Court" and the Antitrust Law: Of Economics, Pop-
ulism, and Cynicism, 67 MICH. L. Rzv. 325 (1968); Bork & Bowman, The Brisi8 in Anti-
trust, 65 COLUM. L. Rzv. 363 (1965). See also M. HANDLER, R. BLmA, R. PrroFsKY, & H.
GOLDSCHMm, TRADE REGULATION, CASES AND MAxTRiALs 918-22 (1975) [hereinafter cited as
TRADE REGULATION].
70. U.S. Dep't of Justice Merger Guidelines, 14 (May 30, 1968).
71. See, e.g., Bauer, Challenging Conglomerate Mergers Under Section 7 of the Clayton
Act: Today's Law and Tomorrow's Legislation, 58 B.U. L. REv. 199 (1978); Bok, Section 7
of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law and Economics, 74 HARv. L. REv. 226 (1960);
Brodley, Potential Competition Mergers: A Structural Synthesis, 87 YALE L.J. 1 (1977);
Dunfee & Stern, Potential Competition Theory as an Anti-Merger Tool Under Section 7 of
the Clayton Act: A Decisional Model, 69 Nw. U. L. Rev. 821 (1975); Markovits, Potential
Competition, Limit Price Theory, and the Legality of Horizontal and Conglomerate Merg-
ers Under the American Antitrust Law, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 658. The so-called actual poten-
tial entry theory, which seeks to measure the competitive impact of a merger by looking to
alternative means of toehold or de novo entry by the acquiring firm, is drawing substantial
attention. See, e.g., Brodley, supra; Carter, Actual Potential Entry Under Section 7 of the
Clayton Act, 66 VA. L. Rzv. 1485 (1980). The Supreme Court has twice declined to consider
the validity of the doctrine in recent years. See United States v. Marine Bancorporation,
418 U.S. 602, 623-41 (1974); United States v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 410 U.S. 526, 537-38
(1973). See also BOC Int'l Ltd. v. FTC, 557 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1977).
72. 386 U.S. 568 (1967).
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petition. 7 s He urged that reviewing bodies weigh possible efficien-
cies against likely anticompetitive effects when applying section
7'74 This proposed balancing approach, however, appears to have
obtained little favor.7 5
The disinclination of the courts to give much weight to efficiency
arguments as affirmative defenses probably stems in part from the
constraints of stare decisis76 and in part from judicial uncertainty
about what constitues a gain in efficiency.77 This judicial uncer-
tainty is not misplaced, given that both the academic and legisla-
tive communities are in almost total disagreement about whether
conglomerate mergers produce substantial efficiencies. Proponents
of the efficiency rationale argue that conglomerate acquisitions
must be dictated by efficiency considerations because the purchase
does not add to the acquiring firm's existing market share. The
acquisition is thus attractive to the acquiring firm only if efficien-
cies which will provide a competitive return on investment can be
brought to the acquired firm.78 In other words, substantial econo-
73. Id. at 598 (Harlan, J., concurring).
74. Id. See also In re General Foods Corp., 69 FTC 380, 449 (1966)(Elman, Commis-
sioner, dissenting).
75. See, e.g., R.S.R. Corp. v. FTC, 602 F.2d 1317 (9th Cir. 1979); IT&T Corp. v. GT&E
Corp., 351 F. Supp. 1153 (D. Haw. 1972), rev'd in part, 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975). See
also United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218 (1947). Cf. Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville
Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 328-29, 334 (1961)(efficiencies must be weighed in favor of the verti-
cal integration by a requirements contract at issue); United States v. International Har-
vester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 780 (7th Cir. 1977); In re The Pillsbury Co., 93 F.T.C. 966 (1979).
76. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
77. A difference exists between "real" economic efficiencies which produce economies in-
hering to the betterment of the marketplace and perhaps to consumers, and efficiencies
which only result in money savings for the firm. See Blake & Jones, supra note 67, at 459.
For example, the gains of advertising efficiency occasioned by an acquisition may not pro-
vide consumers with proportionately more information upon which to make an informed
purchasing division, but may only give greater opportunity for product exposure for the
resulting firm. See FTC v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568, 580 (1967). Further, the
advertising efficiencies may heighten entry barriers by adding to artificial consumer prefer-
ences going beyond the relative advantages of the product. See Address by Donald F. Tur-
ner on Advertising and Competition, delivered before the Briefing Conference on Federal
Controls of Advertising and Promotion, Washington, D.C. (June 2, 1966), reprinted in
TRADE REGULATION, supra note 69 at 1036-39.
78. See, e.g., Turner, Conglomerate Mergers and Section 7 of the Clayton Act, 78 HARv.
L. REv. 1313, 1354 (1965); White House Task Force on Antitrust Policy, Report on Antitrust
Policy (1968)(statement of Robert H. Bork). But this rationale assumes that the acquired
firm market is not already a high return market and thus is not attractive for the reason
alone. More recent arguments for the efficiency of conglomerate mergers include Weston,
Industrial Concentration, Mergers, and Growth: A Summary, in MERGERS AND ECONOMIC
EFICcIENCY, supra note 13, at 38-44 [hereinafter cited as Weston); Brozen, A Comment on
Weston's Industrial Concentration, Mergers and Growth, in MERGERS AND ECONOMIC EFFI-
Loyola University Law journal
mies must be perceived before a conglomerate acquisition is likely
to occur.
Opponents point to empirical evidence which seems to demon-
strate that conglomerate mergers do not yield substantial efficien-
cies."9 This data may indicate that corporate managers often mis-
calculate the economic potential of an acquisition, or it may imply
that mergers are pursued for reasons not directly related to eco-
nomic welfare maximization."0 Further, the same evidence may
mean that small business protectionism is not the antithesis of
welfare maximization."1 Because conglomerate mergers are not par-
ticularly efficient they may not unduly harm the ability of small
enterprises to compete.82 That is, conglomerate mergers may con-
tribute little to firm efficiency or to market concentration."3
The question of corporate control has bearing on the efficiency
dilemma. Berle and Means believed that the increasing diffusion of
stock ownership means that corporate management becomes less
and less subject to the effective control of shareholders, who are
interested only in profit maximization. 4 Concomitantly, managers
gain more freedom to manage the corporation in furtherance of
CIENCY, supra note 13, at 65-69.
79. See S. REID, MERGERS AND THE ECONOMY (1968); Boyle, Pre-Merger Growth and the
Profit Characteristics of Large Conglomerate Mergers in the United States, 44 ST. JOHN'S
L. REV. 152 (1970); Mueller, The Effects of Conglomerate Mergers, 1 J. OF BANKING AND
FINANCE 315, 344 [hereinafter cited as Mueller, Effects]. Cf. Weston, supra note 78, at 40-42;
Weston & Mansinghka, Tests of the Efficiency Performance of Conglomerate Firms, 29 J.
FIN. 919 (1971). The debate has been fueled by recent legislative proposals which would
make large conglomerate acquisitions presumptively illegal. S. 600, 96th Cong., 1st Sesa.
(1979). See also Mueller, Do We Want a New, Tough Anti-Merger Law?, 24 ANIrrrTusT
BULL. 807 (1979).
80. See Mueller, Effects, supra note 79, at 339.
81. Some sentiment exists to scrap § 7 entirely because it is believed incompatible with
achieving a more efficient economy. See R. PosNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPEC-
TvE 97 (1976) [hereinafter cited as R. PosnER].
82. On the other hand, conglomerate mergers may stifle competition because of the in-
creased opportunity for predatory practices which a deep pocket acquiring firm brings to
the acquired firm's market. See Reynolds Metals Co. v. FTC, 309 F.2d 223, 229-30 (D.C. Cir.
1962). See also Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 405 U.S. 562 (1972); FTC v. Proctor &
Gamble Co., 386 U.S. 568 (1967); Edwards, Conglomerate Bigness as a Source of Power in
BUSINESS CONCENTRATION AND PRICE POLICY 331 (1955).
83. See Scherer, Book Review, The Posnerian Harvest: Separating Wheat from Chaff,
86 YALE L.J. 974, 987-88 (1977).
84. See A. BERLE & G. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932). The Berle-Means separation of ownership and control thesis has not been satisfacto-
rily proved empirically. See, e.g., De Alessi, Private Property and Dispersion of Ownership
in Large Corporations, 28 J. FIN. 839 (1973); Kamin and Ronen, The Effects of Corporate
Control on Apparent Profit Performance, 45 S. ECON. J. 181 (1978); Stano, Executive Own-
ership Interests and Corporate Performance, 42 S. ECON. J. 272 (1975).
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their own, as opposed to the shareholders', self-interest. If manage-
rial goals differ from profit maximization, the increased discretion
afforded management by diffused ownership may hinder efficient
firm operation. 5
In a merger context, a diffusion of control and ownership may
have several ramifications. If managers benefit by an increase in
the size of their firm without a concomitant increase in profitabil-
ity, conglomerate mergers may not generally increase efficiencies. 8
Thus, profits or rates of return on common stock may decrease af-
ter a corporate acquisition if managerial autonomy and diversity of
goals do exist.
On the other hand, viewing a prospective acquisition from the
perspective of the about-to-be-acquired firm, it can be seen that
the acquisition may be efficient for that firm even though manage-
ment has a conflict of interest with its shareholders. Inefficient
management will typically be replaced by the acquiring firm. s7
When this occurs, the acquired firm will presumably be operated
in a more efficient manner with a resulting increase in profit levels.
Of course, the existing acquired firm managers, fearing the loss of
their jobs, will likely attempt to block the takeover, even though to
do so is against the best interests of the shareholders.8" To the ex-
85. Substantial theoretical and empirical attention has been given to the question of
managerial discretion. That is, assuming management autonomy from firm ownership, focus
is placed on: (1) what managers will seek to maximize, see note 84 infra; and (2) whether or
not management self-interest will result in firm operation that does not seek profit max-
imization as the primary goal, see, e.g., Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Business
Behavior, 53 Am. ECON. REv. 1032 (1963); Fama, Agency Problems and the Theory of the
Firm, 88 J. POL. ECON. 288 (1980).
86. It has been suggested that the pecuniary and non-pecuniary rewards which managers
receive, such as salaries, bonuses, stock options, and promotions, are more closely tied to the
growth rate of the firm than to its profits. In addition, the prestige and power that managers
seek may be more directly related to size or increases in size than in profit levels. See gener-
ally R. REID, MERGERS, MANAGERS, AND THE ECONOMY (1968); Mueller, A Theory of Con-
glomerate Mergers, 83 Q. J. ECON. 643, 644 (1969). Cf. R. PosNER, & K. SCOTT, EcONOMIcS
OF CORPORATION LAW AND SECURITIES REGULATION, 195-231 (1980); Kummer and Hoffme-
ister, Valuation Consequences of Cash Tender Offers, 33 J. FIN. 505 (1978); Mandelker,
Risk and Return: The Case of Merging Firms, 1 J. FIN. EcON. 303 (1974).
87. See Holl, Control Type and the Market for Corporate Control in Large U.S. Corpo-
rations, 25 J. IND. EcoN. 259 (1977). Cf. Scott, On The Theory of Conglomerate Mergers, 32
J. FIN. 1235 (1977).
88. It may be, however, that the target managers act in the shareholders' interest in
opposing an outstanding tender offer. To the extent that the target managers have informa-
tion that would induce a higher bid or a higher stock valuation, a formal opposition by
existing management to the offer may be an effective and efficient way of communicating
the information to the shareholders. See Bradley, Interfirm Tender Offers and the Market
for Corporate Control, 53 J. Bus. 354, 356 (1980). This point assumes that the current target
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tent they are unsuccessful, efficiency is likely to be advanced.
Similarly, the existing poor management of the acquired firm
may be what makes the acquisition attractive to the acquiring
firm. Thus, the prospect of takeover may limit the autonomy of
management from ownership as well as limit management's discre-
tion to focus on goals other than profit maximization. Acquisitions
may effect efficiency, then, either through the threat or actuality of
takeover.
Of course, the efficiency criterion in antitrust analysis focuses on
the performance of the merged firm, not on the corporate decision-
making process prior to the acquisition. Efficiency measurements
should presumably compare the pre-merger profits of the acquired
firm with post-merger profit levels. The corporate control question
and insight into the reasons for acquisitions, however, may bear
heavily upon post-merger performances. A measure of predictabil-
ity regarding efficiency levels may be gleaned, particularly where
no post-acquisition data is available such as when a merger is chal-
lenged prior to culmination.
It is doubtful, given the conflicting theoretical and empirical evi-
dence, that the conglomerate merger efficiency question can be
conclusively decided. Assuming the efficiency dilemma is not unan-
swerable, the outcome should influence section 7 enforcement and
adjudication. That is, the substantive evidence of the effect of con-
glomerate mergers on gains in efficiency generally should guide the
legal standard to be applied to demonstrable efficiency advantages
in a given situation. If conglomerate acquisitions do not generally
produce substantial efficiences, the standard of analysis imple-
mented should presumably still focus on the probability of an-
ticompetitive effects resulting from the merger. Then the difficulty,
in the conglomerate context, would center around the likelihood
that the potential competition and market structure approach cur-
rently in use is competent to adduce anticompetitive mergers
accurately.89
management has something of importance to communicate to its shareholders. If inept cur-
rent management is a primary reason for the attractiveness of the merger, management
opposition to the merger would still seem to conflict with the target shareholders' best inter-
ests. Current management is not likely to communicate information regarding its own poor
performance.
89. See, e.g., note 71 supra. See also MacLeod, The Relevant Product Market After
Brown Shoe, 12 Loy. CH. L.J. 321 (1981). On the transposing of economic theory to legal
policy, see Brodley, Oligopoly Power Under the Sherman, and Clayton Acts - From Eco-
nomic Theory to Legal Policy, 19 STAN. L. Rav. 285 (1967); Stigler, Mergers and Preventive
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If conglomerate mergers do tend to enhance economic welfare,
the problem lies in determining the weight to be accorded gains in
efficiency. If welfare maximization is to be the sole aim of antitrust
enforcement, demonstrable gains in efficiency should constitute an
absolute defense. The protection of small enterprise or the preser-
vation of deconcentration opportunities would not be worth the
loss of efficiency. The other alternative, an "efficiency rule of rea-
son," is more palatable to those who do not view efficiency and
small business as mutually exclusive.90 Presumably the gains in ef-
ficiency would be balanced against the increase in concentration
resulting from the merger."1 Particular attention would hopefully
be given to the possibility of alternative methods of expansion
which would be less objectionable to competition while achieving
the efficiency increase of the acquisition."
IV.
The role of economic welfare maximization in the conglomerate
acquisition context is of course a crucial part of the larger philo-
sophical warfare over the primary aims of the antitrust laws." For
those scholars who believe that efficiency is always procompetitive,
if the effect on individual competitors is discounted, the efficiency
criterion is the paramount goal for antitrust law to attain." Others
view competition in a different light. Instead of looking at competi-
tion as purely a process of rivalry where only the strong - i.e. effi-
cient - survive, competition, as defined by the antitrust laws, is
seen as protecting the opportunity to compete. Under this view,
Antitrust Policy, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 176 (1955); Rogers, Book Review, 32 VAND. L. REv.
1239, 1240-53 (1979).
90. See notes 81-83 supra and accompanying text.
91. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text. A balancing approach is arguably
even more appealing given the current uncertainty about the efficiencies of conglomerate
mergers.
92. Market entry by internal expansion or by toehold acquisition has traditionally been
favored because an additional entrant is added or a weak entrant is replaced with one more
able to compete significantly. See Note, Budd Co., The Toehold Defense to a Section 7
Attack, 71 Nw. U.L. Rav. 264 (1976); Note, Toehold Acquisitions and the Potential Compe-
tition Doctrine, 40 U. CHI. L. REv. 156 (1972).
93. See Bork, Bowman, Blake, & Jones, The Goals of Antitrust: A Dialogue on Policy,
65 COLUM. L. Rv. 363 (1965); Brodley, Massive Industrial Size, Classical Economics, and
the Search for Humanistic Value, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1155 (1972); Dewey, The Economic
Theory of Antitrust: Science or Religion?, 50 VA. L. Rav. 413 (1964); Elzinga, The Goals of
Antitrust: Other Than Competition and Efficiency, What Else Counts?, 125 U. PA. L. Rzv.
1191 (1977).
94. See, e.g., R. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADox 90-133 (1978); R. PosN'R, supra note 81,
at 18-22; Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 925 (1979).
19811
Loyola University Law Journal
the maximization of efficiency must sometimes give way to non-
economic, political, or social goals such as the protection of the
competitive viability of small business. 95 This "political" approach
derives from a belief that the Sherman Act and Clayton Act Con-
gresses, which were influenced by Populist politics, were not solely,
or even primarily, concerned with welfare maximization. e The fun-
damental American value of freedom of opportunity coupled with
the traditional dislike of concentrations of power can be cited as
underscoring the congressional desire to retain local control and
ownership of business. 97
Section 7 is at the core of this philosophical debate. Antitrust
merger law has been more stringently interpreted as a protective
device for the small, locally-owned competitive entity than any
other provision of the antitrust statutes, 8 with the possible excep-
tion of the Robinson-Patman Price Discrimination Act.99 The Bur-
ger Court has sharply curtailed this protectionism approach and
has seriously questioned the previous methods of ascertaining the
the anticompetitive effects of mergers. Further, our new president
has selected a noted conservative on antitrust enforcement to di-
rect the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice. 00 The
new Assistant Attorney General is on record as favoring a welfare
maximization approach to antitrust enforcement.10' If the efficien-
cies of a merger become an important barometer in the enforce-
ment decision, the courts may be spared the hard efficiency ques-
tions for the near future.102 An efficiency consciousness in the
95. See, e.g., Pitofsky, The Political Content of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 1051
(1979); Schwartz, "Justice" and Other Non-Economic Goals of Antitrust, 127 U. PA. L.
REv. 1076 (1979); Sullivan, Economics and More Humanistic Disciplines: What Are the
Sources of Wisdom for Antitrust?, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 1214 (1977).
96. Cf. R. POSNER, supra note 81, at 20-23; Bork, Legislative Intent and the Policy of
the Sherman Act, 9 J.L. & EcoN. 7 (1966). The legislative debates probably are inconclu-
sive, since both economic and non-economic objectives were frequently considered. See gen-
erally H. THORELLI, THE FEDERAL ANTITRusT POLICY 164-232 (1954).
97. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 315-16 (1962). See also Blake &
Jones, In Defense of Antitrust, 65 COLUM. L. Rav. 377, 381-84 (1965).
98. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962).
99. 15 U.S.C. § 13-13a (1976). See U.S. DEP'T OF JuSTiCE, REPORT ON THE ROBINSON-
PATMAN ACT (1977).
100. The new head of the Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice is William F.
Baxter, Professor of Law at Stanford University.
101. See Silk, Antitrust Issues Facing Reagan, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1981, at 28, col. 1.
102. See Singer, Big Is Back in Favor - But Only If It Promotes Economic Efficiency,
Nat. Journal, April 4, 1981, at 573; Taylor, Antitrust Nominee Says He Plans to Limit
Agency's Role, Prosecute Price Fixers, Wall St. Journal, Mar. 20, 1981, at 4, col. 3. If Pro-
fessor Baxter does challenge mergers more selectively, a striking parallel with the Warren
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Antitrust Division, coupled with the more restrictive approach of
the current Supreme Court, can only mean further retrenchment
of section 7Vlos Only time will tell whether the usefulness of anti-
trust merger law in arresting industrial concentration will be se-
verely undermined, or whether the combination of selective en-
forcement and strict construction will focus section 7 only on those
acquisitions which are truly harmful to a competitive economy.
Court years may occur. If only the most obvious anticompetitive acquisitions are challenged,
where no substantial efficiencies are likely, the Antitrust Division's decision to initiate an
enforcement action will become paramount, just as in the Warren Court years when the
government always won.
103. Some interesting parallels can be drawn between the beginning of the 1980's and
the 1920's. A conservative government and a resulting freedom and respect for business
produced virtually no § 7 enforcement in the 1920's, even in the face of a wave of merger
activity. See TRADE REGULATION, supra note 69, at 429-31. The Supreme Court's approach
to industrial concentration during this time can only be characterized as indulgent. See
United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 274 U.S. 693 (1927); United States v. United States
Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920). Of course the parallel ends when one remembers that the
1920's were a post-war boom economy. But it is interesting to speculate that similar political
and judicial approaches may produce results comparable to the 1920's.
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